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The End of the "Commercial Speech"
Exception-Good Riddance or More
Headaches for the Courts?
By FRNcIS H. HELLER*
"Clearly established in the law of the First Amendment is
the proposition that 'commercial expression' is not entitled to
the protection, or perhaps the same degree of protection of the
Amendment as other expression is entitled, although the ra-
tionale and the ramifications of this distinction have never
been worked out."' These rather categorical words may be
found in an authoritative annotated edition of the Constitution
compiled only six years ago. Less than four years later, the
Supreme Court dispensed with any need to work out the
"rationale and ramifications" by discarding the exception.'
This article will review the short and somewhat uneventful life
of the "commercial speech" exception and will then, in light
of some recent decisions, address itself to an emerging conse-
quence of the elimination of this exception from "clearly estab-
lished" first amendment law.
I. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE EXCEPTION
The commercial speech exception had its beginning in the
1942 case of Valentine v. Chrestensen,3 which involved a New
York ordinance prohibiting distribution of commercial and
business advertising matter in the streets. Chrestensen, who
owned an old Navy submarine, distributed handbills which, on
one side, invited the public to visit this attraction and, on the
other side, protested the city's refusal to let him use city-owned
dock facilities for his display. Upon being restrained by the
police from passing out his leaflets, Chrestensen sought an in-
* J.D. 1941, Ph.D. 1948, University of Virginia; Roy A. Roberts Professor of Law
and Political Science, University of Kansas School of Law.
U.S. Gov'T PRINTING OFF., CoNsTrrTON OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:
ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION 995-96 (1973).
2 Virginia St. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S 748 (1976).
316 U.S. 52 (1942).
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junction, arguing that the police action violated his first
amendment rights.
When the case reached the Supreme Court, Justice Rob-
erts, speaking for a unanimous court, announced:
This court has unequivocally held that the streets are proper
places for the exercise of the freedom of communicating infor-
mation and disseminating opinion and that, though the
states and municipalities may appropriately regulate the
privilege in the public interest, they may not unduly burden
or proscribe its employment in these public thoroughfares.
We are equally clear that the Constitution imposes no such
restraint on government as respects purely commercial
advertising.'
The Court did not elaborate on this conclusory statement, nor
did it support it with authority or reasoned argument; this
declaration is reminiscent of the almost casual way5 in which
Justice Sanford announced that the first amendment would
henceforth apply against the states.
The Chrestensen decision attracted little attention at the
time. Along with two California cases decided the same year,
7
it was the subject of one law review article' which lauded the
support it gave to local governments and the municipal police
power. Only three case notes were published,' two of them
critical, fearing an undermining of contemporary decisions
such as Schneider v. Irvington,10 which had sharply limited
police power to regulate handbill distribution.
At the time of Chrestensen, first amendment law was still
relatively undeveloped." The major cases growing out of World
Id. at 54 (emphasis added).
Cf. Justice Douglas' later characterization of the ruling in Chrestensen as
"casual, almost off-hand," in Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 514 (1959)
(concurring opinion).
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
7 McKay Jewlers, Inc. v. Bowron, 122 P.2d 543 (Cal. 1942).
Resnik., Freedom of Speech and Commercial Solicitation, 30 CALiF. L. REV. 655
(1942).
9 Note, Prohibition of CommercialAdvertising by Handbills and the Right of Free
Speech, 2 BILL OF RIGHTS RE V. 222 (1942); Recent Cases, 26 MINN. L. REV. 895 (1942);
Comment, Governmental Power to Regulate Distribution of Handbills, 8 OHIo ST. L.J.
331 (1942).
" 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
Brennan, The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First
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War 112 and the "Red Scare" of the twenties 13 addressed the
conflict between national security considerations and the indi-
vidual's right to freedom of expression. In the late thirties and
early forties, the first amendment issues came primarily in the
context of labor-management disputes 4 and at the instigation
of a much-bedeviled religious minority, the Jehovah's Wit-
nesses. 5 These decisions, important as they were, did not mark
out legal doctrine beyond the specific issues of the cases. Other
statements from this period such as the one which excluded
from constitutional protection "the lewd and obscene, the pro-
fane, the libelous"'" were, in spite of the frequency with which
such pronouncements have since been quoted, most often
dicta. As Valentine v. Chrestensen demonstrates, first amend-
ment law was still in a period of gestation.
II. HISTORY OF THE EXCEPTION
"In the years following Valentine the commercial speech
exception's use by the Court was so infrequent that it has a
history but barely any development.' 7 Only one case, Breard
v. Alexandria," clearly reinforced the exception. The Court
there upheld an ordinance prohibiting door-to-door solicitation
for magazine subscriptions despite a prior case, Martin v.
Struthers, "1 which had voided a similar prohibition of religious
solicitation.
Amendment, 79 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1965).
12 Pierce v. United States, 252 U.S. 239 (1920); Schaefer v. United States, 251 U.S.
466 (1920); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919); Schenck v. United States,
249 U.S. 47 (1919).
11 Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931); Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380
(1927); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652
(1925).
" AFL v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321 (1941); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940);
Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union, 301 U.S. 468 (1937).
IS Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); West Va. St. Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943); Murdock v.
Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940);
Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
' Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
" Schiro, Commercial Speech: The Demise of a Chimera, 1976 S. CT. REV. 45, 45-
46.
IA 341 U.S. 622 (1951).
, 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
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Justice Reed conceded that "the fact that periodicals are
sold does not put them beyond the protection of the First
Amendment,"" ° but he found that "[t]he selling . . .brings
into the transaction a commercial feature" 2' and it was this
factor that distinguished Breard from Martin. But what about
other for-profit communications? If it was the profit motive
that removed Chrestensen and Breard from the protection of
the first amendment, what about books which are sold for
profit, motion pictures which are exhibited to those who pay
admission to the theater displaying them, advertisements for
which the newspaper printing them is paid? Subsequently, the
Court declared all these activities to be under the protective
umbrella of the first amendment.2
It is useful to consider the confused state of first amend-
ment law during this period. As Justice Brennan observed in
his Meiklejohn lecture,2 the effort to define the scope and lim-
its of first amendment protection was being pursued in three
different ways: by the assertion that the amendment covered
all forms of expression (Justice Black's persistent view) ;24 by
the advocacy of a balancing process;2 and by Alexander Meik-
lejohn's contention that the amendment should absolutely pro-
tect speech related to the governmental process but need not
extend in the same fashion to other kinds of speech. 2 The
concept of a "commercial speech" exception is closely related
to this third approach.
The Supreme Court's decisions of the fifties and sixties
present no clear-cut acceptance of any one of these three ap-
proaches. One need not go as far as Professor Emerson, who
asserted in 1970 that first amendment law was in a "chaotic
state, ' 27 to recognize that this lack of clarity produced a mea-
sure of confusion and contradiction for the bench and bar.
20 341 U.S. 622, 642.
21 Id.
2 New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (advertisements); Smith v.
California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959) (books); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495
(1952) (motion pictures).
2 Brennan, supra note 11.
2, Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U. L. REv. 865 (1960).
'1 Frantz, The First Amendment in the Balance, 71 YALE L.J. 1424 (1962).
26 A. MEmKjOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GovERNMENT (1948).
T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 16 (1970).
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In practical terms, the Supreme Court found ways to place
most civil rights movement activities within the first amend-
ment"8 but shied away from embracing the absolutist view
urged by Mr. Justice Black. Yet the Court's language time and
again sounds chords of a broad, general nature, invoking the
grand phrases of an earlier day in a manner suggesting that
they contain the answers to specific, vexing questions. How-
ever, rarely were lines drawn with the specificity that would
enable one to predict what the courts would do in any given
fact situation.
Increasingly, judges and commentators noted that the no-
tion of a "marketplace of ideas" involved not only a purveyor
of ideas but also a recipient." By 1969, this notion had devel-
oped to the point where the Court could say: "It is now well
established that the Constitution protects the right to receive
information and ideas."" Although the "right to know" may
have answered some first amendment questions, did this obli-
terate the commercial speech exception? In 1964, the Court
still found it necessary to distinguish the New York Times'
acceptance of advertising copy from Mr. Chrestensen's distri-
bution of handbills. 1 In Ginzburg v. United States,32 decided
in 1966, it was commercialism ("pandering") that spelled the
difference between conviction and acquittal. One commentator
in 1969 deplored Chrestensen as "wrong" and "unwise," but
acknowledged that the commercial speech exception was still
the law.3
2 E.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965); Henry v. Rock Hill, 376 U.S. 776
(1964); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963).
See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965); Lamont v. Postmaster
General, 381 U.S. 301, 308 (1965) (Brennan, J., concurring); Thomas v. Collins, 323
U.S. 516, 534 (1945); Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943); Gitlow v. New
York, 268 U.S. 652, 672 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969). See also Kleindienst v. Mandel,
408 U.S. 753, 762-63 (1972).
31 New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964).
32 383 U.S. 463 (1966).
C. ANTiEAu, 1 MODERN CONSTTTIONAL LAw 10, 649 (1969).
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HIl. THE END OF THE EXCEPTION
A. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on Human
Relations
Between 1973 and 1976 the Court faced a succession of
cases which eventually led it to disavow the commercial speech
exception. In the first case in the series, Pittsburgh Press Co.
v. Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations,34 a 5 to 4 ma-
jority held that a city ordinance forbidding newspapers to carry
"help-wanted" advertisements in sex-designated columns did
not violate the newspapers' first amendment rights. Justice
Powell characterized want ads as "classic examples of commer-
cial speech, '35 and thus distinguishable from the political ad-
vertisement involved in New York Times v. Sullivan.
The. dissenters not only questioned the practical difficul-
ties of the commercial speech doctrine, 36 they sought to narrow
Chrestensen to its facts,3" and one dissenter, Justice Douglas,
wanted to abrogate Chrestensen altogether.
38
B. Bigelow v. Virginia
In Bigelow v. Virginia3' the Court had an opportunity to
dispose of the commercial speech exception. One year prior to
Bigelow, four justices had expressed some doubt about the con-
tinuing validity of the exception.'" Thus, with Justice Douglas
added to this group (whose misgivings about Chrestensen were
already on record),4' it seemed that Bigelow presented a perfect
opportunity t6 discard the exception. However, the Court
failed to do so.
The Virginia Weekly, a Charlottesville publication distrib-
uted mainly to students at the University of Virginia, carried
an advertisement by a New York City organization offering to
- 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
15 Id. at 385.
Id. at 395-97 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
" Id. at 401 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
' Id. at 398 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
3, 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
1O Lehman v. Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 314 n.6 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing).
" Pittsburgh Press Co., v. Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations, 413 U.S.
376, 398 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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assist persons desiring an abortion with placement in ac-
credited hospitals and clinics in New York where, the ad
pointed out, abortions were legal.2 Bigelow, the paper's editor,
was charged with violation of the statute and, upon conviction,
sentenced to pay a fine of $500. The Supreme Court of Virginia
affirmed, relying specifically upon the commercial speech ex-
ception. Upon appeal, the United States Supreme Court re-
versed.
3
Part 11 of Justice Blackmun's majority opinion opens with
an extensive discussion of the commercial speech exception,
leading the reader to expect that Chrestensen was about to be
overruled. However, the Court was not quite ready to take that
step. It chose instead to announce that Chrestensen was not
"authority for the proposition that all statutes regulating com-
mercial advertising are immune from constitutional challenge"
and that "[t]he case obviously does not support any sweeping
proposition that advertising is unprotected per se." 4
The Court found that the advertisement, like the one in
New York Times v. Sullivan, contained information on an issue
of interest to the general public and did not advertise some-
thing that was illegal per se, as had been the case in Pittsburgh
Press." The conclusion was that the Virginia statute infringed
first amendment rights, but that "we need not decide in this
case the precise extent to which the First Amendment permits
regulation of advertising that is related to activities the State
may legitimately regulate or even prohibit."" Only Justice
Rehnquist and Justice White dissented. Once again the com-
mercial speech exception had survived but it was now clear
that its days were numbered.
42 421 U.S. at 812.
43 The Court had first remanded the case for reconsideration in light of Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (which had been decided after the appeal had been filed),
but the Virginia court found no reason to change its mind and a second appeal was
taken. 421 U.S. at 815.
" Id. at 820.
' Id. at 820-22. The Court took note of the fact that, subsequent to the publication
that gave rise to this case, New York outlawed for-profit abortion referral services. Id.
at 822 n.8.
4' Id. at 825.
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C. Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council
The occasion for the abandonment of the commercial
speech exception came the following year.4" The plaintiff-
appellees challenged a Virginia statute which prohibited the
advertising of the prices of prescription drugs, primarily on the
ground that it violated potential drug purchasers' "right to
know." Of course, this right to know could prevail only if the
information involved was a form of speech protected by the
first amendment. This led to a review of the commercial speech
exception.
Justice Blackmun, speaking for himself and Justices Bren-
nan, Marshall, Powell, and White,4" noted that, since Breard,
"the Court has never denied protection on the ground that the
speech in issue was 'commercial speech.'-"9 The commercial
speech exception was, he continued, "simplistic," and had
been questioned by several members of the Court, and had "all
but passed from the scene" in Bigelow v. Virginia.0 But
Bigelow had also involved the issue of the public's right to
know about "newsworthy" services. 51 The case now under re-
view presented nothing more than the dissemination of eco-
nomic information, i.e. prices.52
Justice Blackmun took note of the Meiklejohn view that
the first amendment was "primarily an instrument to en-
lighten public decisionmaking in a democracy," and stated
that "we could not say that the free flow of information does
not serve that goal." 53 The effect of this decision was that
speech would no longer be denied protection merely because it
is, either partially or completely, commercial. Valentine v.
Chrestensen was, sub silentio, overruled.54
11 Virginia St. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748 (1976).
11 Mr. Justice Stevens did not take his seat until after the case had been argued
and accordingly did not participate. The Chief Justice and Justice Stewart each wrote
concurring opinions; Justice Rehnquist was the sole dissenter.
11 425 U.S. at 759.
50 Id.
421 U.S. at 822.
52 425 U.S. at 760-61.
5' Id. at 765.
Schiro, supra note 17, at 96, states that "Valentine avoided being overruled...
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But Justice Blackmun was careful to point out that
"[s]ome forms of commercial speech regulation are surely per-
missible." s Just as other varieties of speech are subject to re-
strictions, "time, place and manner" restrictions would still
apply as would constraints on untruthful or illegal expression."
A state does violate the first amendment, however, when it
attempts to "completely suppress the dissemination of conced-
edly truthful information about entirely lawful activity."5
In spite of this careful statement of the decision's scope,
Justice Stewart perceived the decision as "call[ing] into im-
mediate question the constitutional legitimacy of every state
and federal law regulating false or deceptive advertising," 5 and
wrote his separate opinion primarily to emphasize his belief
that laws against false or deceptive advertising were not pre-
cluded by the decision. For Stewart, it was important to note
that the majority opinion adhered to the distinction between
commercial and ideological information. It is pertinent, he ob-
served, that, in the latter category, "under the First Amend-
ment there is no such thing as a false idea,"5 while statements
about prices and products are susceptible to empirical testing.
Thus, while restraint on ideological communication may in-
hibit the operation of the marketplace of ideas, eliminating
deceptive advertising would tend to improve the flow of infor-
mation necessary for making decisions, public or private.
0
Like Justice Stewart's, the Chief Justice's concurring
opinion served primarily to emphasize a point already made by
the majority. Justice Blackmun had specifically noted that
Virginia Pharmacy should not be read as deciding the question
of the constitutional validity of advertising by lawyers or physi-
cians." The Chief Justice deemed it desirable to elaborate on
by being reread as a method-of-distribution case." I find nothing in the Court's opinion
that would indicate that, even so construed, Valentine v. Chrestensen remained a
viable precedent. Or, as another author termed it, Virginia Pharmacy "sent the
Chrestensen rationale to oblivion." Note, The Constitutional Status of Commercial
Expression, 3 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 761, 763 (1976).
425 U.S. at 770.
Id. at 771.
57 Id. at 773.
5 Id. at 776.
51 Id. at 780 (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974)).
Id. at 780-81.
'l Id. at 773 n.25.
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this reservation at some length. 2 It was generally assumed that
this was an issue which the Court would soon face.1
3
IV. THE AFTERMATH OF THE EXCEPTION'S DEMISE
A. Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Willingboro
May a community ban the display of "for sale" or "sold"
signs in front of residential property as a means for reducing
property turnover and enhancing community stability? A
unanimous Court held, on the authority of Virginia Pharmacy,
that such an ordinance was in violation of the first amend-
ment. 4
Justice Marshall's opinion rejected respondents' claim
that the Willingboro ordinance could be distinguished from the
Virginia Pharmacy statute. The respondents had maintained
that, unlike Virginia Pharmacy, the Willingboro ordinance
sought to promote a vital societal objective: stable, racially
integrated housing. Justice Marshall, while acknowledging the
importance of the goal, held that even an important govern-
mental goal would not justify state interference with the free
flow of truthful information. In any case, the respondents had
failed to establish that this particular regulation was necessary
in order to achieve that goal-or, for that matter, that it would
serve to do so.65
The Linmark decision mentioned, but did not decide, the
question Justice Stewart had raised earlier. In reaffirming
Virginia Pharmacy the opinion specifically noted that "[liaws
dealing with false or misleading signs . . .would raise very
different constitutional questions. '66
B. Bates v. State Bar of Arizona
As previously noted, the issue of advertising by practicing
,2 Id. at 773-75.
11 See generally Note, Bar Restrictions on Dissemination of Information about
Legal Services, 22 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 483 (1974); Comment, Solicitation by the Second
Oldest Profession: Attorneys and Advertising, 8 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 77 (1973).
11 Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977). Mr. Justice
Rehnquist did not participate.
' Id. at 93-96.
68 Id. at 98.
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attorneys, although not before the Court in Virginia Pharmacy,
was in the Justices' minds when they decided that case. When
the Court's next term began, an appeal from a decision of the
Supreme Court of Arizona67 presented the issue in clear-cut
fashion.
John Bates and Van O'Steen had listed the fees which
their legal clinic charged for certain specified legal services in
an advertisement in a Phoenix newspaper. Because this action
violated Disciplinary Rule 2-101(B) of the American Bar Asso-
ciation, which had been incorporated in the rules of the Su-
preme Court of Arizona, the two lawyers were censured by that
court after disciplinary proceedings by the state bar.
The issue before the Court was "whether lawyers. . . may
constitutionally advertise the prices at which certain routine
services will be performed." 8 To support the prohibition on
advertising the state bar had offered six justifications," all of
which the majority rejected. The state bar had also contended
that, even if attorney advertising were permissible, Bates and
O'Steen's advertisement should be proscribed because it was
misleading.70 Justice Blackmun found this line of argument
unpersuasive and concluded that "it has not been demon-
strated that the advertisement at issue could be suppressed."' 7
But, as he had done in Virginia Pharmacy, Justice Black-
mun then proceeded to note what had not been decided. False,
deceptive, or misleading advertising could, "of course," be con-
trolled. Advertising claims as to the quality of service "may be
so likely to be misleading as to warrant restriction," and the
same was probably true of in-person solicitation. It might even
be permissible to require some specific warning or disclaimer
to protect the consumer. Regulations as to time, place and
manner of advertising were, of course, permissible if not unrea-
'7 In re Bates, 555 P.2d 640 (Ariz. 1976).
" Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 367-68 (1977).
Id. at 368-79.
70 Three specifics were alleged: (1) the term "legal clinic" was not defined; (2) the
advertisement asserted that the prices were "very reasonable," when in fact uncon-
tested divorces, for example, could in some circumstances be obtained for less than
the quoted price; (3) the advertisement failed to disclose that a change of name (one
of the services for which a price was listed) could, under Arizona law, be secured
without the services of an attorney. Id. at 381.
7, Id. at 382.
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sonable. Lastly, the problem of the use of electronic media
remained. 2
There were three dissenting opinions, by the Chief Justice,
Justice Powell (joined by Justice Stewart), and Justice
Rehnquist. Justice Rehnquist was the only Justice who would
still maintain the commercial speech exception.7 3 The Chief
Justice's brief opinion argued, in the main, that it had been his
understanding that Virginia Pharmacy had been strictly lim-
ited to the facts of that case. In fact, his concurring opinion in
that case had already signaled the position he was now taking:
that legal services, by necessity, varied so greatly from case to
case that any indication of costs would not only be difficult but
also often misleading. "[I]ncomplete information could be
worse than no information at all. It could become a trap for the
unwary."74
The longest and most elaborate of the dissenting opinions
was authored by Justice Powell. In addition to the points made
by the Chief Justice, Justice Powell meticulously argued that
it is virtually impossible to establish what is "reasonable" with
respect to legal services; the subjectivity of the categorization,
description, and rates of legal services makes it difficult to
ascertain "empirically" when lawyer advertising is
"misleading."7 5
The organized bar, Justice Powell noted, is aware of the
fact that low- and middle-income citizens experience difficulty
obtaining legal services at prices they can afford. Many prob-
lems still remain, but the "imposition of hard and fast...
rules . .. [is not] likely to serve the public interest."7 The
first amendment interests asserted, i.e., the right to know,
were, to Justice Powell, "marginal," and should not be deemed
sufficient to impose a remedy which, the Justice feared, might
actually result in the public being victimized.77
Id. at 383-84.
7' Id. at 404. "The Valentine distinction was constitutionally sound and practi-
cally workable, and I am still unwilling to take even one step down the 'slippery slope'
away from it." Id. at 405.
Id. at 387.
Id. at 397.




C. Ohralik v: Ohio State Bar Association
One question specifically reserved in Bates was whether
and how far a state might regulate "in-person" solicitation.18
In its next term the Court encountered this question in Ohralik
v. Ohio State Bar Association.
7
Ohralik, a practicing lawyer, had received word of an auto-
mobile accident and called on the victims of the collision, two
eighteen-year-old women, and prevailed upon them to retain
him as counsel on a contingency fee basis. Although his services
were, in the end, not used by either of the women, he sued them
for one-third of the amounts they had received from the insur-
ance company. Following complaint and grievance procedures,
the Supreme Court of Ohio suspended Ohralik from the prac-
tice of law.80
On appeal, Ohralik argued that, for purposes of constitu-
tional analysis, his conduct could not be distinguished from
that of Bates and O'Steen and was thus protected by the first
amendment. The Court agreed that in-person solicitation by a
lawyer contained elements of protected speech but considered
them "subordinate" and hence subject to a lower level of judi-
cial scrutiny than that applied in either Virginia Pharmacy or
Bates.81 "A lawyer's procurement of remunerative employment
is a subject only marginally affected with First Amendment
concerns. It falls within the State's proper sphere of economic
and professional regulation."8
Ohralik had also contended that his conduct had been free
of any of the evils which a state might wish to prevent or
suppress. However, the Court indicated that the state is enti-
tled to adopt regulations of a preventive nature whose applica-
tion is not conditioned upon the actual occurrence of the pro-
scribed harm.OJustice Marshall's concurring opinion 84 is rele-
7 Id. at 366.
7, 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
Id. at 449-52.
I Id. at 457.
Id. at 459.
13 Id. at 464.
" Id. at 468-77. The concurrence covered both Ohralik and In re Primus, 436 U.S.
412 (1978), decided the same day. In Primus, the Court reversed the dis ciplinary action
taken by the Supreme Court of South Carolina against an attorney who had advised
prospective clients of the availability of free legal assistance from the American Civil
1978-79]
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vant in this context because of its insistence that the state's
legitimate interest in the solicitation area should be no differ-
ent than that applying to advertising, i.e., actual fraud, over-
reaching, deception, and misrepresentation. 5 Thus he took
particular exception to the Court's statement that in-person
solicitation is entitled to less protection under the first amend-
ment than is "the kind of advertising approved in Bates. "I His
footnote at this point is worth quoting:
The Court may mean simply that conducting solicitation
in person presents somewhat greater dangers that the State
may permissibly seek to avoid. But if instead the Court
means that different forms of "commercial speech" are gener-
ally to be subjected to different levels of First Amendment
scrutiny, I cannot agree. The Court also states that "in-
person solicitation of professional employment by a lawyer
does not stand on a par with truthful advertising about the
availability and terms of routine legal services." The relevant
comparison, however, at the least, is between truthful in-
person solicitation of employment and truthful advertising.,-
D. First National Bank v. Bellotti
Another recent decision of the Supreme Court bearing on
commercial speech is First National Bank of Boston v.
Bellotti.85 At issue was the constitutionality of a Massachusetts
statute that prohibited business corporations from making con-
tributions or expenditures to influence the outcome of a vote
on any question submitted to voters other than questions mate-
rially affecting the property, business, or assets of the corpora-
tion. The statute had been upheld by the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts against charges that it abridged speech
in violation of the first and fourteenth amendments.85 The Su-
preme Court reversed, with Justice Powell writing for himself
Liberties Union. The commercial speech issue did not enter into the decision in
Primus.
436 U.S. at 474-77.
Id. at 474 (quoting 436 U.S. at 455).
Id. at 474 n.5.
435 U.S. 765 (1978). See generally an article written by the lead counsel for the
appellants in that case, Fox, Corporate Political Speech: The Effect of First Natinal
Bank of Boston v. Bellotti on Corporate Referendum Spending, 67 Ky. L.J. 75 (1978).
359 N.E.2d 1262 (Mass. 1977).
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and Justices Blackmun, Stevens, and Stewart; the Chief Jus-
tice writing a concurring opinion; Justice White, in dissent,
writing for himself and Justices Brennan and Marshall; and
Justice Rehnquist dissenting separately.
Justice Powell's opinion, after reviewing the broad sweep
of first amendment theory, noted that the Court's recent com-
mercial speech decisions
illustrate that the First Amendment ...prohibit[s] gov-
ernment from limiting the stock of information from which
members of the public may draw. A commercial advertise-
ment is constitutionally protected not so much because it
pertains to the seller's business as because it furthers the
societal interest in the "free flow of commercial information"
[citing Virginia Pharmacy and Linmark] .1
Although Justice Powell's views did not command a ma-
jority of the Court, it is pertinent to note his emphasis on the
"right to know" as the underlying rationale for the protection
of certain kinds of commercial speech. Yet it was Justice Pow-
ell who had maintained in Bates that some kinds of informa-
tion, specifically advertising by attorneys, could be constrained
if the danger of deception outweighs the potential benefits of
dissemination. 1
If there is to be analysis of the "worth" of certain kinds of
speech, what is the role of the marketplace of ideas? Is this
concept of the value of "uninhibited, robust and wide open" 2
speech inconsistent with the screening of commercial expres-
sion for "truth"? The concluding section of this article will
address itself to this question, using a recent state court deci-
sion and a Supreme Court opinion as vehicles of analysis.
V. MUST THE COURTS BECOME ARBITERS OF ADVERTISING?
The Aetna Life Insurance Company placed two advertise-
ments in New York and Newsweek magazines captioned, re-
spectively, "Too Bad Judges Can't Read This to a Jury" and
"And Now, The Big Winner in Today's Lawsuits." The thrust
435 U.S. at 783. None of the other opinions discussed commercial speech.
" Who is to make the decision that there is such a danger of deception is an
interesting question which has not yet been definitively resolved.
11 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 260 (1964).
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of these advertisements was to point out that the tendency to
award large sums as damages in personal injury suits resulted
in increases in insurance premiums charged. The ads included
such language as:
Every payer of liability insurance is a loser .... The
jury is cautioned ... to bear in mind that money does not
grow on trees. It must be paid through insurance premiums
from uninvolved parties such as yourselves. . . . We can ask
juries to take into account a victim's own responsibility of
[for?] his losses. . . . Insurers, lawyers, judges-each of us
shares the blame for this mess. But it is you, the public, who
can best begin to clean it up."
Quinn v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co.94 was the case that
tested the degree of protection that this advertisement's
"speech" should be afforded. Quinn and two other women were
plaintiffs in personal injury actions. They sought to enjoin the
publication of the advertisements on the grounds that they
were calculated to influence potential jurors and would thus
deprive the plaintiffs of their constitutional right to an impar-
tial jury. The company asserted that the publication of the
advertisements was protected by the first amendment (and the
corresponding section of the state constitution) and asked that
the complaint be dismissed.
Justice Graci of the New York Supreme Court reviewed
the state of first amendment law, noting that the recent trend
of decisions had been to employ a "balancing mechanism" and
that the present case specifically required such a balancing of
the right to an impartial jury and first amendment rights. This
led him to an analysis of the commercial speech cases from
Chrestensen to Ohralik and Linmark. Justice Graci concluded
that the most recent cases taught that "while commercial
speech is 'protected' under the First Amendment from prior
restraint, the protection afforded is less than that provided for
noncommercial speech, so that when commercial expression is
false or misleading it is afforded no protection whatsoever." 5
93 Quinn v. Aetna Life.& Cas. Co., 47 U.S.L.W. 2025 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Queens City.,
July 11, 1978). Quotations are taken from the full text of the opinion made available





The advertisements in question, Justice Graci found, were
misleading because they failed to indicate that excessive per-
sonal injury awards may be reduced or set aside if they are in
fact excessive and unwarranted. Being misleading, the adver-
tisements were not entitled to the protection of the first amend-
ment. Accordingly, he granted plaintiff's prayer for a prelimi-
nary injunction and dismissed the company's cross motion to
dismiss.
Similar results were reached in Friedman v. Rogers.6 At
issue in Friedman was a Texas statute that prohibited the
practice of optometry under a trade name. The Supreme Court
first found that the use of trade names is "commercial speech
and nothing more, '9 7 just as the advertisements were in
Virginia Pharmacy. However, unlike the advertisements of
services and prices in Virginia Pharmacy, which were "self-
contained and self-explanatory,"" a trade name has "no intrin-
sic meaning" and is thus capable of being "manipulated,"
leading to the "possibility that trade names will be used to
mislead the public."99 The Court envisioned several possible
ways that trade names could be deceptive' °0 and concluded
that the Texas statute, which still permitted the type of factual
information permitted in Virginia Pharmacy and Bates, ac-
tually "ensure[d] that information regarding optometrical
services will be communicated more fully and accurately" than
with the use of "ambiguous associations with a trade name."'' 0
" 99 S. Ct. 887 (1979). The entire discussion of Friedman was added by the
editors.
" Id. at 895. The Court distinguished the Belotti case as involving the "free
discussion of governmental affairs." Id. at n.10. The Court carefully segregated speech
into commercial and non-commercial speech: "Our decisions dealing with more tradi-
tional First Amendment problems do not extend automatically to this [the commer-
cial speech] as yet uncharted area." Id. at n.9.
" Id. at 895.
Id. at 895-96.
IN Id. at 896-97. The Court felt that a trade name might "remain unchanged" even
though those optometrists whose reputation the trade name reflects are no longer
associated with it. Also, the Court felt that a trade name permitted an optometrist to
separate himself from his personal reputation and change names if he acquired a bad
reputation. Different names could be given to shops under common ownership and
thus create the "false impression of competition." Finally, trade names facilitate "the
advertising essential to large-scale commercial practices with numerous branch off-
ices." Id.
"I Id. at 897.
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The dissent by Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice Mar-
shall, heartily disagreed with the majority's finding of the po-
tential for deception in the Texas statute.02 Pointing out that
commercial (as opposed to professional) optometry had never
been made illegal in Texas,103 Justice Blackmun felt that the
use of trade names "serves a distinctly public interest."' 4 In
addition, the dissent felt that the Court's holding actually en-
couraged deception since it forbade commercial optometrists
from conveying the fact that they were commercial optometr-
ists."°' Also, Justice Blackmun felt that the services of an opto-
metrist are so "highly standardized" and "mechanical" as to
render unnecessary the Court's "highly paternalistic"'0 6 ap-
proach, since consumers could make decisions based on "their
own best interests."'' 7 Finally, Justice Blackmun felt that the
Texas statute prohibited "the dissemination of truthful infor-
mation about .. .wholly legal commercial conduct."'0 8
These cases suggest that the present state of the law of
commercial speech requires the courts to determine whether
and when speech, usually advertising, is in fact, or has the
potential to be, misleading. The burden that this inquiry
places on the courts reminds one of the analagous area of
church-state relations: after the first tvo modern cases had
been decided by the Supreme Court,"0 the distinguished con-
stitutional scholar Edward S. Corwin warned that the Court
was about to become the nation's "super" school board." 0 The
rash of cases on church-state relations on the Court's docket in
recent years demonstrates that Professor Corwin's prediction
"02 Id. at 899.
103 Id.
I" Id. at 901. Among the values enchanced by the use of trade names, Justice
Blackmun noted that commercial optometry results in uniformity and speed of service;
that trade names result in valuable product identification; and that trade names serve
to bring legal activity into public view. Id. at 900-01.
" Id. at 902.
"' Id. at 903.
'1 Id. (quoting Virginia St. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976)).
108 Id.
"I McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948); Everson v. Board of Educ.,
330 U.S. 1 (1947).




was not far off target."' Is the Supreme Court now about to
become the nation's super review board for advertising?
Edward Levi has pointed out that the movement of con-
cepts into and out of the law can be perceived as consisting of
three stages:
The first stage is the creation of the legal concept which
is built up as cases are compared .. . The second stage is
the period when the concept is more or less fixed, although
reasoning by example continues to classify items inside and
out of the concept. The third stage is the breakdown of the
concept, as reasoning by example has moved so far ahead as
to make it clear that the suggestive influence of the word is
no longer desired."
'2
The evolution of the commercial speech exception fits Levi's
description. By the time Virginia Pharmacy came before the
Court, the third stage had clearly been reached. It was time to
acknowledge that the phrase had outlived its usefulness.
But where are we now? Arguably a new first stage, as
indicated by the Court's division in the most recent cases, is
unfolding in the area of commercial speech. This new state is
perhaps characterized by the Court's inquiry into the
"misleading" nature of advertising. Has the Court established
an empirical standard of review for commercial speech that
would examine advertising with a view toward whether the
assertions made in such advertising are susceptible of proof as
to the truth therein? Such a standard would guarantee that
only the purest form of advertising-that which can be empiri-
cally tested, such as price advertising-would enjoy the degree
of first amendment protection available to noncommercial
speech. This approach leaves subjective areas, such as the
quality of legal or optometry services, open to state regulations.
Perhaps such factors as the tremendous size of certain massive
areas of communication, e.g., the electronic media, would ren-
der those areas more susceptible to misleading statements and
" E.g., Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977); Roemer v. Bd. of Pub. Works,
426 U.S. 736 (1976); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975); Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S.
825 (1973); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971); Walz v. Tax Commission, 397
U.S. 664 (1970); Abington Sch. District v. Schempp,,374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engle v.
Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
"1 E. LEvi, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 6 (1949).
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thus open for state regulation. The variables regarding what is
susceptible of proof of truthfulness are many, thus rendering
this "uncharted""' 3 area difficult indeed to chart.
What appears to be needed is a reformulation which, with-
out returning to the notion of the commercial speech exception,
recognizes the basic distinction Meiklejohn advanced:"' the
marketplace of ideas is essentially dedicated to the effective
functioning of free government. Meiklejohn (and those who
followed his lead) did not speak of the right to know; perhaps
that term had not yet gained currency. But the recent commer-
cial speech cases point up the need for a clearer understanding
of the weight to be given this factor in first amendment analy-
sis. Is the right to know the pros and cons of public issues really
no more important than the right to know drug prices or attor-
neys' fees? Certainly it would seem to be. A focus on Meikle-
john's premise will, in Professor Levi's terms, assist the Court
in moving beyond the first stage.
,,3 Friedman v. Rogers, 99 S. Ct. 887, 894 n.9 (1979) (see note 96 supra).
"I Meiklejohn, supra note 26.
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